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POTTER STEWART
Terrance Sandalow*
N the spring of 958, Justice Harold Burton informed Pres-

ident Eisenhower of his decision to retire at the end of the
Term, but, at the President's request, withheld public announcement until the latter was ready to name a successor.
In September, Eisenhower appointed Potter Stewart, who became, at age forty-three, the second youngest person to serve
on the Supreme Court since the Civil War.
Despite Stewart's youth, his appointment was not a surprise to the handful of law clerks who knew of Justice Burton's
impending retirement. We had concluded that Stewart was
the likely choice almost as soon as we had learned of Justice
Burton's decision. I should like to claim that our prediction
demonstrated astuteness, but the truth is otherwise. Although
he had been serving on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit for only four years, Stewart had already established a
reputation as one of the country's ablest judges. Our expectation that he would be named reflected our hopes far more
than the shrewdness of our political judgments.
Justice Stewart joined the Court at a particularly difficult
time in its history. The bitter attack upon the Court that had
been sparked by Brown v. Board of Education' had not yet
subsided; indeed, it had been fueled by a number of decisions
that curbed some of the excesses of the anticommunist hysteria
from which the country was emerging. 2 The intensity of the
attack may be gauged by two events. In August 1958, the
Conference of State Chief Judges adopted a resolution calling
upon the Court to recognize and give effect "to the difference
between that which, on the one hand, the Constitution may
prescribe or permit and that which, on the other, a majority
of the Supreme Court, as from time to time constituted, may
deem desirable or undesirable." ' 3 More significantly, in May,
the Senate Judiciary Committee had reported out a bill that
would have stripped the Court of jurisdiction in state bar
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. University of
Chicago, A.B., 1954; J.D., 1957. Dean Sandalow served as Justice Stewart's law
clerk during the Justice's first Term.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 55 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
3 See Resolution on Federal-StateRelationships As Affected by JudicialDecisions,
32 ST. GOV'T 74 (1959).
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admission cases and reversed four of the Court's recent deci-4
sions, three of which had important constitutional overtones.
The bill failed by only eight votes.5
There were also internal problems. On a surprising range
of issues, the eight Justices whom Justice Stewart joined on
the Court displayed a tendency to vote in blocs. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black, -Douglas, and Brennan were arrayed on one side and Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
and Whittaker on the other side of a line that was popularly
regarded as dividing "liberals" and "conservatives." The division was the source of some tension within the Court, but
the particulars are not mine to reveal.
Justice Stewart's relative youth and the fact that he held
only a recess appointment until nearly the end of the Term
must have added to the burden that the external pressures and
the internal division would have imposed upon any new appointee. But if any of these circumstances weighed upon him,
he gave no indication of that fact to his law clerks. Rather,
we learned from his example the strengths to be found in
adherence to a professional tradition.
The relationships between the members of the Court and
their clerks are various, depending largely upon the personalities of the Justices. Our relationship with Justice Stewart was
informal and open. 6 He regularly reported the decisions taken
at the Friday conferences and responded fully to our inquiries
about positions that had been taken during the Court's deliberations. He tried out his ideas on us 7 and permitted us to
watch him struggle with the decisions he found difficult. Yet
I cannot recall a single instance - I am confident there was
none - in which Justice Stewart spoke disparagingly of another member of the Court. He freely discussed his disagreements with other Justices, but he never attempted to buttress
his position by demeaning those with whom he disagreed.
From other chambers we learned of blunders by a Justice at
the conference, or heard of uncomplimentary statements by
one Justice about another, but never from Justice Stewart.
Although deprived of the titilation that comes with being privy
4 S. REP. No. 1586, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 2624, 85th Cong., ist Sess.
(1957). See generally W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 154-71, 208 (1962).
s 104 CONG. REc. 18,687 (1958).
6 John L. Evans, Jr., who now practices law in Cincinnati, also served as a law
clerk to Justice Stewart during the Justice's first Term.
7 In an informal talk to alumni of the Yale Law School, Justice Stewart once
likened his law clerks to a backboard, against which he could bounce ideas. It is
characteristic of the man that immediately aftenvards he sought us out to make
certain that our feelings had not been hurt by his description of the role.
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to the secrets of those in high places, we gained a lesson in
the meaning and importance of civility more valuable than the
gossip we were denied.
Justice Stewart's refusal to traffic in gossip or personalities
was an attribute of the whole man, but it was rooted more
particularly in his commitment to a professional code that also
signficantly influenced his intellectual stance toward the work
of the Court. Shortly after his appointment, responding to a
newsman's request that he characterize himself as a judicial
liberal or conservative, Justice Stewart said, "I like to be
thought of as a lawyer." 8 Inability to predict the course of a
Justice's career on the Court has become a part of our folklore,
but Justice Stewart's characteristically unpretentious statement
presaged his performance during the nearly twenty-three years
that he served on the Court. I do not mean, of course, that
one might have foretold many, or even any, of the thousands
of votes he cast in that period. After all, many of the issues,
great and small, that were to come before the Court during
his tenure could not have been anticipated at the time he was
appointed. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart's belief that the judicial role is grounded in the lawyer's craft served as the
foundation for a stable and consistent approach to the work
of the Court during a period in which it decided more novel
and important issues than in any other in its history.
Yet one may say of Justice Stewart, as he once wrote of
Justice Jackson, that throughout this period:
[He] remained the despair of those Court observers - and
they are many - who fatuously insist on pinning a "conservative" or "liberal" label on every Justice. To the result-oriented critics of the Court -

and they are far too many -

he

remained something of a puzzle to the end. I think he would
have regarded their puzzlement with detachment, if not with
scorn. 9

Justice Stewart never confused cases with causes or ideology.
The responsibility of the judge, in his view, is to decide the
former, not to promote the latter.

8 Israel, Potter Stewart, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT,

1789-

1969, at 2921, 2921 (L. Friedman & J. Israel eds. i969); see also Powell, Justice
Stewart, 95 HARV. L. REV. I, i (ig8i).
9 Stewart, Robert H. Jackson's Influence on FederalState Relationships, 23 REC.

A.B. CITY N.Y. 7, 26-27 (1968) (footnote omitted). I doubt, however, that the last
sentence accurately describes Justice Stewart's attitude. He too, I suspect, "regards
the puzzlement of the result-oriented critics with detachment," but with amusement
and wonder rather than scorn.

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 8 1981-1982

198i]

JUSTICE STEWART

Cases arise in specific factual settings. The issues they
present, as my colleague Jerold Israel - also a Stewart clerk
- observed in describing the Justice's conception of the judicial role:
are far too complex to be resolved by the simple application
of one or two absolute values. The judge views an issue in
the context of a specific factual situation, and his resolution
of the issue must take into account a multitude of considerations presented by that context - considerations too diverse
and complicated to be categorized or analyzed readily in terms
of any set of doctrinaire labels. His decisions cannot be based
upon abstract generalities, but must be the product of a careful evaluation of all relevant factors that will produce an
answer that is pragmatically and theoretically sound. l0
Justice Stewart's attentiveness to the uniqueness of cases and
sensitivity to the competition among values are largely responsible for his reputation as a "swing vote" within the Court.
The reputation is deserved if what is meant is that he did not
predictably side with one or another of the voting blocs into
which the Court tended to divide on the dominant issues of
the past quarter century. But insofar as it rests upon the
notion that he lacked guiding principles, it reflects a failure of
understanding."
Shades of gray may not be perceptible to
everyone, but they exist nonetheless. Justice Stewart inhabits
a world in which moral and political choices, and therefore
legal decisions, are made in gray areas. Both emotionally and
intellectually, he appreciates that cases that reach the Supreme
Court rarely present simple contests between the forces of light
and the forces of darkness. Each of the litigants, as well as
the larger interests that each represents, seeks recognition of
claims that might reasonably be embraced within the concept
of the public interest.
Justice Stewart's opinions and voting record reveal a deep
commitment to the central tenets of the American liberal tradition fair process, representative government, freedom
from arbitrary or oppressive governmental action, individual
autonomy and the value of privacy in fostering it, and the free
expression of ideas. No one who knows him will doubt that
these ideals are part of the fabric of the man. He did not,
however, regard them as a program that his office entitled him
to advance. One reason, no doubt, was his continual aware10 Israel, supra note 8, at 2921.
I
Professor Israel's perceptive essay, written near the end of Justice Stewart's first
decade on the Court, is required reading for anyone who seeks an understanding of
those principles. See id.
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ness that the ideals often collided with one another and with
others that are recognized by our legal tradition. Another, I
suspect, was the belief that the Court could not govern the
country, certainly not well and perhaps not at all.
To be sure, the Court's place in our constitutional system
requires that it check governmental action inconsistent with
our evolving ideals, and Justice Stewart did not shrink from
that responsibility. But like Justice Jackson and Justice Harlan, the two members of the post-World War HI Court with
whom he has the greatest affinity, he resisted broad limitations
on governmental power that would have disabled government
from dealing with societal conflict. Justice Stewart was, I
believe, reflecting his own views as much as he was describing
Justice Jackson's when, in one of his few extramural statements, he quoted the latter's comment that "[t]he vice of judicial supremacy, as it existed for ninety years in the field of
policy, has been its progressive closing of the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of our social and economic
conflicts."

12

The years during which Justice Stewart served on the
Court were as emotionally charged as any in its history. They
were years in which the ideal of judicial detachment was sorely
tested and in which some even questioned its worth. Justice
Stewart remained faithful to the ideal. Whatever his personal
sympathies, he did not as a judge enlist in any causes nor ally
himself with any faction. He also met what may have been
a more difficult challenge: to avoid becoming the captive of
those with whom he disagreed. The independence of spirit
and mind that he displayed during these troubled years could
not have been achieved without great personal and intellectual
strength. Those who worked for him and those for whom he
worked -

the people of the United States -

are deeply in his

debt for the skill and effectiveness with which he maintained
the ideal.
12 R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 321 (1941),

Stewart, supra note 9, at 14.
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